University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 31
Number 1 Summer/Fall 2000

Article 18

2000

Recent Developments: Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens: A Private
Individual May Not Bring Suit in Federal Court on
Behalf of the United States against a State under the
False Claims Act
Scott H. Arney

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Arney, Scott H. (2000) "Recent Developments: Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens: A Private
Individual May Not Bring Suit in Federal Court on Behalf of the United States against a State under the False Claims Act," University of
Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 31 : No. 1 , Article 18.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol31/iss1/18

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

Recent Developments

Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rei.
Stevens:
A Private Individual May Not Bring Suit in Federal Court on Behalf of the United
States Against a State Under the False Claims Act
By Scott H. Arney

T

he Supreme Court of the
United States held that a
private individual may not bring a suit
in federal court on behalfofthe United
States against a State or state agency
under the False Claims Act ("FCA").
Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources v. United States ex rei.
Stevens, 120 S. Ct. 1858 (2000). In
so holding, the Court found that a
State or state agency is not a "person"
subject to FCA's qui tam' provision.
Furthermore, while the Court
immunized States from lawsuits under
the FCA, a private individual has
standing to bring an action against
"any person" in federal court on behalf
of the United States.
Respondent Jonathan Stevens
("Stevens") alleged that the Vermont
Agency of Natural Resources
("Agency"), his former employer,
submitted false claims to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") in connection with federal
grant programs. Stevens alleged that
the Agency overstated the amount of
time spent by its employees on the
federally funded projects, defrauding
the federal government ofmore grant
money than the Agency was entitled
to receive.
Stevens brought a qui tam
action in the United States District
Court for the District of Vermont

against the Agency. The Agency filed
a motion to dismiss, arguing that a
State or state agency is not a "person"
and thus not subject to liability under
the FCA. In addition, the Agency
contended that the Eleventh
Amendment bars a qui tam action
against a State. The district court
denied the agency's motion.
Thereafter, the Agency filed an
interlocutory appeal and the district
court stayed further proceedings
pending its outcome. The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision.
The Suprem~ Court granted a writ of
certiorari to determine if a private
person has Article ill standing to bring
such a suit, whether the action against
the state is barred by the 11th
Amendment, and if a State is
considered a "person" under the qui
tam statute, and if so, whether the
State is immune from suit.
The Court began its analysis by
examining the FCA's history. ld at
1860. The FCA imposes civil liability
upon "any person" who "knowingly
presents, or causes to be presented,
to any officer or employee of the
United States Government ... a false
or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval." /d. (citing 31 U.S.C. §
3729(a) (1994)). The defendant in
such an action may be liable for up to

treble damages and a civil penalty up
to $10,000 per false claim. /d. In
addition, a false claim action can be
brought by either the federal
government or a private person, also
known as a relator. /d. In cases in
which the relator initiates the action,
he/she is entitled to receive a share
of any of the proceeds that are
recovered, including any amount
received in a settlement or judgment,
plus attorney's fees and costs. /d. at
1861 (citing31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)
& (2) (1994)).
Next, the Court addressed the
jurisdictional question of whether
Stevens had standing under the U.S.
Constitution, art. ill, section 2, clause
1. /d. at 1861. The Court found
that there are three requirements for
standing to be established: ( 1) the
moving party must establish "injury
in fact," that is, a harm that is both
"concrete" and "actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical." /d.
(quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495
U.S. 149, 155 (1990)); (2) there
must be causation, and "a fairly ...
trace[able]" connection between the
injury in fact and the alleged conduct.
/d. (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Organization, 426
U.S. 26, 41,96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976));
and, (3) redressability- a "substantial
likelihood" that the requested relief
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will resolve the alleged injury. !d.
at 1861-62. (quoting Simon at 45,
96 S. Ct. at 1917)). The Court
considered these factors to be
essential to Article III's "case and
controversy" requirement. !d. at
1862.
The Court explained that
Steven's interest in the litigation,
specifically his share of the proceeds
of any recovery, provided Stevens
with a "concrete private interest in the
outcome of[the] suit." !d. (quoting
Lujan v. Defenders ofWildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). However,
consistent with previous holdings, the
Court found that the relator's interest
in the recovery is not alone sufficient
to justify standing. !d. at 1863.
Instead, the Court turned to the theory
that Stevens, the assignee of a claim,
has standing to assert the injury in fact
suffered by the assignor (the United
States Government). !d. The Court
found that in the case of the FCA, a
partial assignment of the
Government's damages claim is made
to the relator, and thus standing is
conferred to Stevens. !d.
The Court continued and
examined the longstanding history of
such statutes. !d. As the Court found
above, qui tam actions date back to
l4 1h century English statutes that
confirm the relator's standing
requirement mandated by Article III.
!d. at 1863-64.
The Court then turned to the
merits ofthe case: (1) the Agency's
contention that a State is not a
"person" subject to the FCA's qui tam
provision, and (2) the Eleventh
Amendment's barto suing a State. !d.
at 1865.
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To determine the definition of
the term "person," the Court analyzed
the FCA's text to determine the
"longstanding interpretive presmnption
that a 'person' does not include the
sovereign." !d. at 1866. The Court
found in the absence ofan "affinnative
showing oflegislative intent to the
contrary," the term "person" does not
include States for the purposes ofqui
tam liability. !d. at 1867. Subsequent
amendments, in 1982 and 1986,
support the Court's finding that
Congress did not intend the word
"person" to include States or state
agencies. !d. at1868. In fact, the
Court found that changes to the law
present no evidence to suggest the
term "person" included States. !d.
Comparisons to terms defined
contained in ensuing legislation
suggested that States are not
considered "persons." !d. In other
acts Congress elected to define
"person" and include State in the
definition. !d. at 1869. The Court
found that the absence of State in the
false claim provision's definition of
"person" is a further indication ofthe
Legislature's intent to exclude States.
Moreover, the Court found that
qui tam liability is very punitive in
nature, and thus, considering a State
a "person" would contradict the
"presumption against imposition of
punitive damages on governmental
entities." !d. (quoting Newport v.
Fact Concerts, Inc., 435 U.S. 247,
262-63 (1981)).
Finally, the Court compared the
term "person" in the FCA to the
Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act
of 1986 ("PFCRA"), an act creating
administrative remedies for false

claims. !d. at 1870. The PFCRA
exempts States from liability for
monetary damages. !d. Thus, the
Court utilized the PFCRA's text to
conclude that the intended meaning of
"person" in the FCA exempts States
as well. !d.
Because the Agency was not
deemed a "person" under the FCA,
the Court declined to offer a ruling
concerning the Eleventh Amendment
immunity issue. !d. at 1859-60.
However, the Court noted in dicta that
a qui tam action against a State is in
doubt as far as violating the Eleventh
Amendment. !d. at 1860 (citing
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288,
348 (1936)).
Justices Stevens and Souter
dissented, opining, ''the 1986 amendments also declare that a 'person' who
could engage in a violation of
§ 3729 --thereby triggering the civil
investigative demand provision-includes any State or political
subdivision of a State." !d. at 1871
(citing §6(a), 100 Stat. 3168 (codified
at 31 U.S. C. § 3733(1)(1 )(A), (2), &
(4) (Supp. 2000)). In contradiction to
the majority, the dissenters believed
the statutory text makes it clear that
Congress intended to include States
in the term "person." !d.
The False Claims Act, originally
enacted in 1863 and signed into law
by President Lincoln, has returned
more than $3 billion to the federal
treasury from those who knowingly
present false or fraudulent claims for
payment. 2 Nearly every year the
health care and defense industries
lobby Congress to gut the False
Claims Act or attempt to defeat the
law in the courts. The Supreme

Recent Developments
Court's ruling adds validity to a
very powerful and necessary
instrument that prevents fraudulent
activity.
Although a private citizen may
not sue a State or state agency in
federal court under the law, the
Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the False Claims
Act by holding that a relator has
standing to bring suit. By doing so,
the Court has ensured the statute's
future use by the federal government
and relators.

The term qui tam is Latin
for "who as well for the King as for
himself sues in this matter."
2
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/
pr/2000/February/079civ.htm
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